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Abstract. In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and
failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest
in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this
to the fore. In this paper, we use agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples,
to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. We
argue for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This
argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in
ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value
even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism
to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further,
the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to
emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties.
Keywords:
1. Introduction
The recent economic catastrophes in Asia, continued volatility of the Japanese stock mar-
kets, and failures of major Japanese financial institutions and industrial corporations have
increased national interest in corporate governance issues. In North America, the linger-
ing effects of the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis, the sudden spate of corporate losses from
derivative trading in the early 1990s, the failures of several large Canadian financial insti-
tutions in the late 1990s, and the collapse of Long Term Credit Corporation most recently
have also led to increased attention on the roles and processes of the board of directors.
The Toronto Stock Exchange report on Corporate Governance, the Professional Conduct
guidelines issued by the National Association of Corporate Directors, the OECD Guide-
lines on Corporate Governance and the Hampel report (a follow-up to the Cadbury report)
illustrate the serious energy accorded to this issue on a global scale. In this paper, we hope
to contribute to the growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on corporate gover-
nance by suggesting a market selection process for governance mechanisms. Specifically,
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we attempt to argue that there are two forms of corporate governance systems in Japan and
that the change in ownership structure and poor performance of a firm operating under one
system would trigger the emergence of the other. We suggest that under certain conditions,
the failure of traditional Japanese stakeholder-centered (i.e., network-based) corporate gov-
ernance leads to a stockholder-centered (or market-based) monitoring system. We argue
that this process is part of an evolutionary global trend, driven by the globalization of fi-
nancial markets and intensified product market competition, toward the agency relationship
between managers and shareholders rather than managers and stakeholders in corporate
governance.
A main characteristic of the Japanese industrial system has been its tight network
of supplier and buyer companies (keiretsu), which are known for their extensive cross-
shareholdings among members and their banks (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Gerlach, 1992;
Sheard, 1994). Gerlach (1992) reports that 70 to 75 percent of shares owned in Japan be-
long to the ‘affiliated stable investors’ category, defined as long-term, keiretsu-affiliated
holders of shares. These investors do not own the stocks of affiliate companies for in-
vestment purposes (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Rather, Japanese institutional shareholders
are often also a company’s business partners, so that cross-shareholdings are expressions
of business goodwill, information exchange, mutual monitoring, and provides the foun-
dation for formalizing long-term, open-ended business relationships (Clark, 1979). Given
this, Japanese institutional investors usually have other priorities than the maximization
of returns on their shareholdings in keiretsu member firms (Gerlach, 1992). Consequently,
the boards of directors of many Japanese firms have not given much attention to the in-
terests of non-keiretsu shareholders. Indeed, their implicit mandate has been to arbitrate
the claims of competing stakeholders (employees, suppliers, banks, etc.), sometimes by
expropriating from non-network members, rather than to focus exclusively on shareholder
returns (Aoki, 1988). Such an arrangement worked as long as shareholders were silent
and had other interests to pursue, and firms were able to fund their growth needs from
internally generated cash flows and from friendly banks. This situation began to change
in the early 1990s as the Japanese domestic consumer market went into recession and
competition from the newly restructured U.S. and European as well as Asian corporations
increased.
Some observers have noted that the traditional emphasis on stakeholders and the resulting
lack of priority given to shareholders’ investment returns have recently given way to a more
market-driven approach to corporate governance, which has led to a greater emphasis on
shareholders’ interests (Watanabe, 1994; Kikuchi, 1999). Since the late 1990s, Japanese
firms have become increasingly exposed to foreign capital markets as foreign institutional
investors increased their holdings of Japanese stocks and foreign multinationals acquired
large equity stakes in some Japanese firms such as Mazda, Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors.
These changes have led to the increased demand for disclosure and transparency by foreign
investors (Kikuchi, 1999). In addition, global competition has escalated in sectors that were
traditional Japanese strongholds such as consumer electronics (from Taiwanese, Korean and
European firms), automobiles (from German and American firms), and chemicals (from
European and American firms). Furthermore, prolonged poor corporate performance in
Japan has made the institutional environment friendlier toward corporate governance reform.
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This has been viewed positively in the capital markets and media, which have generated
more legitimacy for further reforms. This phenomenon provides a useful backdrop for
studying the evolution of corporate governance in Japanese firms, particularly the way one
system of governance is selected over another.
Using agency theory, institutional theory and comparative case studies, we derive
propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese
firms. Specifically, the focus of this paper is to explore the links between firm-specific
factors and governance systems to better understand the changing structure of Japanese
corporate governance. In the next section, we discuss the general principles underly-
ing the stakeholder-centered or network-based Japanese corporate governance system.
Then, we examine a series of comparative cases to illustrate two types of corporate
governance systems (stakeholder-centered and stockholder-centered) and develop a
series of propositions from the resulting model. We conclude with some future research
suggestions.
2. Agency theory and the Japanese firm
Agency theory attempts to deal with problems that arise in bilateral relationships when
the goals of a principal and an agent conflict, and when it is difficult or expensive for the
principal to verify the agent’s actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Eisenhardt (1989),
the large modern corporation, wherein professional managers operate the firm as the agent
for a large group of shareholders, presents a classic situation in which the agency problem
arises. However, the notion of agency is broadly applicable to situations in which incomplete
information and monitoring do not allow the principal to write complete contingent claims
contracts and is therefore exposed to potential expropriation by the agent. In Asia the
use of two classes of equity allows controlling shareholders who do not own a majority
of the equity to co-opt the boardroom so as to expropriate minority shareholder claims.
The theory posits a number of monitoring mechanisms that attenuate the agency problem
between managers and shareholders. These include the external managerial labor market,
performance-based compensation, the presence of outside members on the board, and the
takeover market (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). The theory predicts that these mechanisms can
solve the agency problem by narrowing the divergence of interests between shareholders
and management.
While there is some empirical evidence to support the view that these mechanisms reduce
agency problems in the Anglo-American context, where the basis for economic exchange
is the written contract, it is unclear whether these mechanisms can work in the Japanese
context, where the basis for economic exchange is often the relationship (Dore, 1983;
Sako, 1992). In fact, extensive cross-shareholdings between large firms and their banks
effectively insulate management from any interference by outside investors including hostile
acquirers (Charkham, 1994; Kester, 1991). In Japan, the Japanese main banks take on
the responsibilities for corporate governance by acting as active principals in the agency
relationship (Aoki, 1990; Sheard, 1989). The main banks, as the largest lender to its corporate
clients, have a long-term stake in the viability of these corporations. The main banks,
together with other major lenders also control large blocks of their client companies’ equity.
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Using their legal rights as block shareholders, and their access to information as debtors,
the main banks monitor the business decisions of their client firms with a view to long-term
viability, so as to safeguard their debt holdings and equity investments (Sheard, 1989). This
dual role as major credit supplier and large equity holder places the main banks, at least in
principle, in the critical role of monitoring and disciplining the Japanese corporate sector
(Aoki, 1990; Aoki, Patrick and Sheard, 1994; Sheard, 1989).
Another type of corporate monitoring mechanism prevalent in Japanese firms is the
informal mutual monitoring carried on by member firms of corporate groups or horizontal
keiretsu (Gilson and Roe, 1993). Many Japanese firms belong to such horizontal keiretsu,
including the former zaibatsu-based and bank-centered networks of large firms (Sheard,
1994; Gerlach, 1992). Member firms in this type of grouping are formally related through
cross-shareholding arrangements. The vertical keiretsu, on the other hand, is usually formed
with a large hub firm (e.g., Toyota, Hitachi, Matsushita, etc.) and its suppliers, subcontrac-
tors, and other firms in its value chain. In this type of grouping, the hub firm often holds
minority and sometimes majority shares in member firms. Because of the close relations
among member firms within the same group, vertical and horizontal keiretsu also play a
critical role in the governance of corporate Japan (Gilson and Roe, 1993; Sheard, 1994).
Although the exact nature of such meetings are not publicly disclosed, it is the practice
of top Japanese keiretsu executives to meet regularly to discuss general business trends or
exchange corporate information (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Gerlach, 1992). Here, in the
Presidents’ Council, they gather information on member firms’ activities and if necessary,
discipline deviant firms by moral suasion if they engage in business conduct seen to be
detrimental to member firms. This type of discipline mechanism inevitably favors the in-
terests of keiretsu members rather than those of non-affiliated shareholders whose main
aim is to maximize returns on investments. The minority cross share ownership by member
firms provides the legal and moral basis for their claims. While each member firm usually
controls only a small share of each other’s equity, the collective weight of all the members
is large enough to impose control over individual member firms (Berglof and Perotti, 1994;
Gilson and Roe, 1993).
Some have said that the board of directors in Japan exists as a token of the law. It
comprises almost exclusively of retired company executives, other insiders, and former
government officials (Abbeglen and Stalk, 1985; Charkham, 1994). Typical of many Asian
corporate boards, appointments are based on loyalty, and long service; the boardroom is
seen as a place to cap off a distinguished career in the firm. Although Gerlach (1992) argues
that the Presidents’ Council performs the active monitoring functions typical of a board of
directors, one result of such monitoring arrangements is that strategic decisions are often
defensive rather than offensive. The keiretsu disciplines its members for deviant behavior,
but is not structured to encourage strategic innovation and risk taking (Charkham, 1994).
Therefore, organizational change is often impeded and needed restructuring forestalled,
especially when the economic interests of supplier and customer keiretsu members are at
stake.
The hub company of a vertical keiretsu is usually the largest shareholder in its affiliate
firms and often represents their largest single customer. Through the boardroom and in the
trading relationship, the hub firm exerts direct and unilateral oversight of its keiretsu member
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firms (Orru, Hamilton, and Suzuki, 1989; Gilson and Roe, 1993). Thus, the effectiveness
of the disciplinary mechanism in vertical keiretsu is directly related to the extent of the
business and stockholding linkages between member firms in the network (Gilson and Roe,
1993). Again, this type of governance system favors a stakeholder approach to corporate
decision making because a firm’s trading relationships with network partners is multilateral,
which may require the sub-optimization of particular bilateral ties in order to optimize the
entire network.
The important point in this discussion is that the objectives of monitoring by the Japanese
main banks or corporate group hub firms do not necessarily coincide with those of other
shareholders who hold shares primarily for investment purposes. The tight relationships
engendered by the keiretsu or corporate group ensure that all companies in the system feel
the shocks (drastic declines in sales, resignation of key employees, etc.) experienced by
one company (Nakatani, 1984). This implies that the result of monitoring is not always an
enhancement of a firm’s profitability or stock price, but rather an insurance of stability in
earnings and sales to protect the interests of other stakeholders such as suppliers, manage-
ment and employees. In an empirical study, Nakatani (1984) found that corporate group
firms were more interested in maintaining stable profits and attenuating risk among member
firms than on achieving high profits. Other studies found that keiretsu firms and main bank
client firms tend to have lower profits (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995;
Kong and Shivdasani, 1999). Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that one of the reasons for
the lower profits of main bank clients is that, due to their loan exposures, banks are more
risk averse than other types of equity investors, which leads to more conservatism in the
boardroom. The upshot of this is that a stakeholder-centered corporate governance system
is not designed to promote the interests of a shareholder whose main aim is to earn higher
returns on his investment.
We have argued that in the Japanese firm, keiretsu shareholders are interested in pro-
tecting the interests of stakeholders by stabilizing cash flows and lowering operating risks.
Theoretically, however, a stakeholder-oriented firm can achieve superior profitability and
shareholder returns. Such examples as Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, and 3M attest
to this possibility. Generous job benefits and security or guaranteed orders can motivate a
firm’s employees or suppliers to strive for better services and products; consequently deliv-
ering higher profits. Such a result, however, is not a natural consequence of the stakeholder
model of corporate governance. Instead, if we accept that individuals maximize their utility
functions, a strategic focus on stakeholder satisfaction necessarily precludes a focus on
maximizing profitability. When the interests of principals collide, the resolution of these
interests depends on the structure of the ownership of the firm. Specifically, when there are
no controlling interests, managers have de facto control over corporate resources and there-
fore will assign them to maximize their utilities (Hill and Phan, 1997). However, if there is
a controlling interest, then the utility function of the controlling shareholder is maximized,
which may mean the sub-optimization of other shareholders’ goals (Leighton and Thain,
1998).
In contrast to the stakeholder-centered governance system, there also exists in Japan a
stockholder-centered governance form. Here, independent Japanese firms that do not belong
to any corporate group or keiretsu or have only weak affiliations with them often depend
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on the external capital markets for financing and growth (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein,
1990). In such cases, the dictates of arms length investors appear to have a stronger influence
on their behaviors, leading to a corporate form and governance philosophy similar to that of
American corporations. From the agency theory perspective, these independent Japanese
firms present a case in which the agency problem between managers and shareholders is
more clearly highlighted.
Because of this feature, independent Japanese firms tend to focus on maximizing share-
holder value, which may include taking risky business decisions that can potentially generate
high earnings, but also increase the unpredictability of their cash flows. The unpredictability
of cash flows makes it difficult for such firms to offer stable commitments to stakeholders
such as life-time employment for employees and fixed purchase order quantities for sup-
pliers, which necessarily subordinates their residual value claims to the shareholders who
want higher investment returns (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991).
It should be noted here that in both corporate governance systems, the interests of share-
holders that also happen to be business partners and lenders are still served. Even in the
stockholder-centered system, a large portion of shares is still held by business partners
whose interests are not solely focused on maximizing investment returns. Many Japanese
firms have the characteristics of both systems. Therefore, we are not arguing for the mer-
its of one system over another. Instead we are suggesting that firms in a predominantly
stockholder-oriented system experience a higher degree of capital market pressure, which
leads to different strategic choices. We further develop this idea by exploring the insti-
tutional context, using institutional theory. Since the legal and social environment of an
economic system has a direct impact on the system of corporate governance, our model
will be incomplete without reference to this important variable.
3. Institutional theory and Japanese corporate governance
The institutional theory framework for modeling firm behaviors asserts that organizations
attempt to incorporate norms in their institutional environments so that they can gain legit-
imacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). These organizational behaviors can be described as a process of
isomorphism, which is caused by institutional pressures and expectations. Isomorphism is
defined as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units
that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The the-
ory suggests that such pressures and expectations force organizations to show conformity,
because organizations compete not only for economic resources but also for political power
and institutional legitimacy (Dacin, 1997; Suchman, 1995). Thus, institutional theorists
argue that organizations conform to certain norms, both structural and procedural, because
it is expected of them to do so and that the breach of such an expectation would destroy
legitimacy, thus denying the organization access to resources needed for survival.
In the original conception of the theory, this perspective rejects rational choice as the
motivator of firm behaviors but instead puts a greater emphasis on the appearance of
rationality as a path to legitimacy. Managerial actions are thus dictated by existing rules,
belief systems, and examples (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
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Since organizational success is achieved by conformity to exogenously created norms, the
management of legitimacy is the most important task for managers.
This view of organizational behavior flies in the face of standard economic theory and thus
later developments have attempted to combine the institutional and rational perspectives
for a more plausible mid-range theory (Oliver, 1991, 1997). This is due to the observation
that legitimizing institutional pressures often conflict with each other, so that organizations
can gain legitimacy from some, but not from all sources of legitimacy (D’Aunno, Sutton,
and Price, 1991). Oliver (1991) presented a model in which social legitimacy, perceived
economic gain, external dependence, and the consistency of institutional norms are causal
factors of isomorphism. In her model, a firm’s response to institutional pressures can accom-
modate its rational economic objectives as well as non-rational acquiescence to institutions.
Practically, this means that a firm’s motive to response to institutional norms and its rational
choice to gain economic benefits cannot always be clearly separated.
Applying institutional theory to the recent shifts in Japanese corporate governance, one
cannot help but acknowledge that such behaviors are simply isomorphic in nature. Attempts
to reform corporate governance can be seen simply as another way for Japanese firms to
gain legitimacy under a shifting global economic rationale. We observe that Japanese public
sentiments on corporate governance practices changed after the collapse of stock prices in
1990 and the continued poor showing of large Japanese keiretsu throughout the 1990s.
During this period, there have been demands for greater transparency of corporate practices
and more attention paid to the interests of shareholders from such groups as investment
associations, shareholders’ rights groups, the stock market regulators, and the Ministry of
Finance (Watanabe, 1994). Because of this emerging sentiment, pressure on Japanese firms
to reform their corporate governance has also risen in recent years (Kikuchi, 1999).
The rising institutional pressures to improve corporate governance can be seen in var-
ious places. For example, the Japan Investor Relations Association (JIRA) was estab-
lished in 1993 to promote better information disclosure by Japanese firms to investors and
shareholders. In 1995, Keidanren or the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, a
powerful lobbying group, issued a statement emphasizing the importance of improving in-
formation disclosure by Japanese firms to stimulate the growth of equity transactions in the
domestic stock markets (Keidanren, 1995). To promote a stockholder-oriented corporate
governance system in Japan, the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan was established
in 1994. The Japanese government, in its turn, was the first OECD country to adopt the
recommendations of the latest OECD Corporate Governance Best Practices Guidelines
promulgated in March of 2000. Newspaper articles on corporate governance abuses and
reforms are now commonplace, where barely 5 years ago they were unheard of. Indeed the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun has begun to publish Economic Value Added (EVA) measures on
large Japanese firms, as a way of emphasizing the importance of efficient capital use.
An institutional theory perspective therefore suggests that Japanese firms have started
to pay more attention to their corporate governance practices because of the increased
public expectations for corporations to deal with this issue. Under such an environment,
Japanese firms, especially those that are still performing poorly, have come under in-
creased pressure to implement stockholder friendly corporate governance practices. Thus,
in addition to the agency problem, institutional pressure has become another factor that
190 YOSHIKAWA AND PHAN
could prompt Japanese firms to shift toward a stockholder-centered corporate governance
system.
4. Comparative case examples
Data and method
This section examines two pairs of comparative case examples, Sony and Mitsubishi Electric
and Honda and Nissan, to illustrate the differences and implications for the stakeholder
and stockholder-centered corporate governance systems discussed in the previous section.
Data and information for these cases were collected from their annual reports, articles in
business journals such as Nikkei Business and Toyo Keizai, Nikkei Kaisha Joho (a databook
published by Nikkei), the publications of the Security Analysts Association of Japan, and
other publications on the cases.
Firms in the Japanese automobile and electronics industries were chosen because they
represent industries most exposed to the competitive global product and capital markets and
hence have had to respond more quickly than firms in other industries. Because of global
competition, they are the least protected of domestic industries and therefore represent the
purest form of freely competitive markets in the Japanese corporate sector. Their relatively
greater exposure to global capital markets mean that they are under pressure to respond
to the needs of arm length market investors, whose main interests are to maximize returns
on investments. We chose these pairs of firms as they provided the best contrast between
independent and the keiretsu-affiliated firms in terms of their corporate governance practices.
They were also similar in size and therefore made comparisons valid (see Table 1).
We examined their historical backgrounds, ownership structure, information disclosure
practices, recent corporate governance reforms, and historical performance. Ownership
structure was chosen because agency theory suggests that it will determine firm behavior
and performance (Hill and Snell, 1988, 1989). Information disclosure practices function
to mitigate information asymmetry between management and capital market participants,
which allows for better monitoring of managerial decisions (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991;
Baldwin, 1984). The agency theory perspective thus suggests that ownership structure and
information disclosure practices are important factors mitigating the agency problem.
As Table 1 suggests, Sony and Honda, latecomers to their respective industries, are
independent firms with little affiliations to the major corporate group (or horizontal keiretsu).
Mitsubishi Electric and Nissan are old-line corporate group firms that hail from the zaibatsu
family business groupings that predate World War II. In order to keep the discussion clear,
we do not consider the vertical or main bank keiretsu, although we suspect that the same
phenomenon can be seen in those types of networks.
Case examples
a. Sony and Mitsubishi electric. Sony is a relative latecomer in the Japanese consumer
electronics industry. It was established in 1946 by Masaru Ibuka as a venture firm in Tokyo
and did not belong to any major corporate groups. Although independent, it mirrors most
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Table 1. Sales and employment figures of Sony, Mitsubishi electric, Honda, and Nissan (March 1994–March
2000).
Sony Mitsubishi electric Honda Nissan
1994.3 3,733,721 3,105,431 3,862,716 5,800,857
23,209 49,571 30,961 50,611
1995.3 3,983,438 3,250,876 3,966,164 5,834,123
22,685 48,452 29,587 47,431
1996.3 4,592,565 3,511,359 4,252,250 6,039,107
22,411 48,208 28,626 41,897
1997.3 5,663,134 3,725,192 5,293,302 6,658,875
21,639 47,521 28,284 40,690
1998.3 6,755,490 3,801,344 5,999,738 6,564,637
21,296 46,450 28,774 40,153
1999.3 6,794,619 3,794,063 6,231,041 6,580,001
21,645 44,535 29,110 35,106
2000.3 6,686,661 3,774,230 6,098,840 5,977,075
19,187 42,989 28,840 32,707
Upper line: consolidated sales figures (in million yen).
Lower line: domestic employee numbers.
Source: Japan Kaisha Joho, 1993–2000.
Japanese companies in that it has a close working relationship with a major bank, in this case
Sakura Bank (formerly Mitsui Bank). Despite its latecomer status in the industry, Sony is
often regarded as one of the more globally successful Japanese firms. However, this was not
always the case. In the 1950s and 1960s the company found it difficult to obtain bank loans
because it lacked the close ties with the pre-war zaibatsu groups, which were the bases for
raising capital in post-war Japan (Morita, Reingold, and Shimomura, 1986). The company
had no choice but to use the foreign capital markets to raise the funds for innovation and
growth.
In 1961, Sony issued its first American Depository Receipts (ADR) in the U.S. market.
By 1970, it had already listed common shares on stock exchanges in New York, London, and
Amsterdam, among the first Japanese firm to do so. This was novel to most large Japanese
corporations (Sanwa Sogo Kenkyujo, 1995), which still depended on debt capital through
bank borrowings, fed by extremely high household savings rates. This early reliance on
capital from the foreign capital markets, rather than on keiretsu financing or bank borrowing,
had a great impact on the way the company conducted itself and was governed at the top
(Morita, Reingold, and Shimomura, 1986).
Since the 1961 issuance of ADRs, Sony has actively disclosed corporate operations and
performance information to American investors according to strict Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) requirements (Sato, 2000). Till recently, such disclosure practices are
unheard of in Japan (Sanwa Sogo Kenkyujo, 1995). As Sony expanded its foreign operations
and established its brand name in foreign markets, the company’s strategies came under the
increasingly close scrutiny by foreign investors and analysts. This has allowed the company
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to develop a sophisticated investor relations (IR) protocol, which has created a shareholder
friendly reputation for the company (Sato, 2000). For example, the Japan Investor Relations
Association (JIRA) conferred its first excellent IR Company Award to Sony in 1995. The
Securities Analysts Association of Japan also chose Sony as the best company for corporate
disclosures in the electronics field in Japan in 1995, 1996, and 1999. Therefore, even
though the disclosure requirements are American, Sony has been able to institutionalize
such practices throughout the organization, so that in Japan, even though they did not have
to, such practices continued to be used. These achievements suggest that the company is
paying close attention to the interests of investors and capital market participants.
A notable characteristic of Sony’s ownership structure is the large portion held by foreign
investors. In 1998, foreign investors held 43.6 percent of the company’s shares as com-
pared to 20.3 percent of Matsushita’s, 11.8 percent of Sharp’s, and 6.1 percent of Sanyo
Electric’s, all of which are Sony’s competitors. Another characteristic of Sony’s owner-
ship structure is the relatively small fraction of equity controlled by stable shareholders
and cross-shareholdings with supplier firms. Sony’s stable shareholdings comprised only
43.4 percent of total equity in 1998,1 while the majority of Nikkei listed Japanese firms
claim stable shareholdings of over 60 percent (Gerlach, 1992, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July
26, 1996). International retail and institutional shareholders with no ties to Sony hold shares
primarily to enjoy higher returns on their investment, which is indicative of the extent to
which Sony emphasizes share value maximization as a performance goal.
As the result of its emphasis on investor relations, Sony has also built a reputation for
taking corporate governance seriously in the Japanese market (Teramoto, 1997; Sato, 2000).
In June 1997, the company completely restructured its board of directors by reducing the
number of directors from 38 to 10,2 and constitutionally defined and separated the roles
of directors and executive officers. Again, in the context of Japanese corporate life, this
was seen as a drastic step because board membership is a form of reward given to loyal
employees,3 (Abbeglen and Stalk, 1985). Going even further than any independent Japanese
corporation, three of the ten directors were outsiders or non-former employees. They were
the Chairman of Blackstone Group, an active U.S. based institutional investor, Chairman
of Sakura Bank, and Chairman of Goldman Sachs Securities Japan.
Contrasting Sony’s board restructuring to the highly publicized failed attempt by T. Boone
Pickens, a well known corporate raider with more than 15 percent ownership share, to obtain
a board seat on Koito Corporation, a Toyota corporate group affiliate, one gets the idea that
Sony was breaking new ground with the appointment of a foreigner on the board. Sony is
also the first large Japanese firm in 1998 to implement a remuneration package that is linked
to stock price for its senior executives and non-Japanese managers in foreign subsidiaries
(Sato, 2000). While this is not new to many American corporations, in Japan, such practices
were unheard of at the time because many Japanese firms did not see the enhancement of
shareholder value as their prime objective.
Mitsubishi Electric’s pedigree is very different from that of Sony. The company was cre-
ated as a spin-off of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in 1921 and is currently one of 29 Mitsubishi
corporate group’s Presidents’ Council member firms. Its membership on the Council re-
quires the heavy equity participation of other Mitsubishi group companies. In 1998, three
of the top ten shareholders of the company were Mitsubishi group companies: Meiji Life
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Table 2. Foreign ownership, stable shareholding positions and corporate group affiliationsa of major Japanese
electronics firms (1998).
Company Foreign ownership (%) Stable shareholding positions (%) Corporate group affiliation
Mitsubishi Electric 11.0 61.0 Mitsubishi
Hitachi 27.5 49.3 Fuyo, Sanwa, DKBb
Toshiba 9.4 59.1 Mitsui
Matsushitac 20.3 60.9 Matsushita
Sony 43.6 43.4 Independent
Sharp 11.8 72.4 Sanwa
Fujitsu 14.5 68.0 DKB
NEC 13.7 67.2 Sumitomo
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 1999.
aMitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, DKB.
bDKB: Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank group.
cMatsushita is the hub firm of the Matsushita keiretsu group.
Insurance, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, and Mitsubishi Trust. They are the main financial
institutions that handled the major corporate finance and treasury needs of the group. Com-
pared to other firms in the same industry, foreign ownership in Mitsubishi Electric, at 11.0
percent in 1998, is relatively low (Table 2). At that time, the firm reported stable ownership
of 61.0 percent of total shares. Although this figure is not particularly high when compared
to other firms belonging to corporate groups, it is much higher than Sony’s. In addition,
compared to Sony,Mitsubishi Electric’s reliance on bank borrowings is heavy. Bank loans
in its total liabilities accounted for 29% in 1998, compared to 0% for Sony.4 Thus, this
relatively low exposure to arms length market investors suggests that Mitsubishi Electric’s
affiliates are effectively governing the firm.
Compared with the board of directors of Sony, insiders dominate the board at Mitsubishi
Electric. In 1997, only two out of thirty three directors were not former employees of
the company.5 Of the two non-former employees, one is a former official of the powerful
Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the other is president of Mitsubishi Cor-
poration, the hub firm of the group. On the audit committee, which by law is constituted
from a different group of people, only two of the five statutory auditors are non-former
employees wherein one is a former chairman of Mitsubishi Bank and the other is a lawyer
and former public prosecutor.
Thus, among the 38 directors and statutory auditors, only four are non-employee directors
with two from the Mitsubishi group. The number of directors is also four times larger than
Sony’s suggesting a dispersion of power and high potential for passivity in the boardroom.
Further, because the company belongs to one of the largest corporate groups in Japan
it is secured by extensive cross-shareholdings and has access to debt capital from the
group’s financial institutions. The characteristics of its ownership structure and governance
system suggest that Mitsubishi Electric has not felt the same pressure as Sony to meet the
demands of its investing public for transparency. Among professional investors, Mitsubishi
Electric is not known for its information disclosure or investor relations practices. For
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Table 3. Return on sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE) of Sony, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and Matsushita
(March 1996–March 2000).
Sony Mitsubishi Toshiba Matsushita
1996 ROS 1.2 1.7 1.8 −0.8
ROE 5.0 7.1 7.8 −1.7
1997 ROS 2.5 0.2 1.2 1.8
ROE 10.6 1.1 5.4 3.9
1998 ROS 3.3 −2.8 0.1 1.2
ROE 13.6 −15.0 0.6 2.5
1999 ROS 2.6 −1.2 −0.3 0.2
ROE 9.8 −7.6 −1.2 0.4
2000 ROS 1.8 0.7 −0.5 1.4
ROE 6.1 4.4 −2.8 2.8
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 2000.
Table 4. Percentage changes (%) in stock price of Sony and Mitsubishi electric.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 93–99
Sony −3 +29 +8 +9 +52 −31 +274 +611
Mitsubishi +11 +33 +5 −12 −51 +7 +89 +36
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 2000.
example, recent rankings on corporate disclosure by the Security Analysts Association of
Japan rated the company the worst among nineteen major Japanese electronics firms in
1999.6
The contrasts in the corporate performances of Sony, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and
Matsushita, all direct competitors, in terms of return on sales (ROS) and return on equity
(ROE) are stark. Table 3 reports ROS and ROE in the 1996–2000 period. Table 4 shows
the percentage changes in stock price of Sony and Mitsubishi Electric between 1993 and
1999. During the period between March 1996 and March 2000, Sony recorded significantly
better performance than the other three electronics firms. Sony’s stock also demonstrated
significantly better performance than Mitsubishi Electric’s, growing over 600% during the
7-year period, while Mitsubishi’s stock price improved only 36%.
These performance figures suggest that Mitsubishi Electric, as a member of a major
keiretsu, is less focused on shareholder value, while Sony appears to have an unambiguous
view on what is important to its economic performance. In fact, Sony’s senior managers
have often made the statement that the enhancement of shareholder value is a critical
corporate objective.7 To achieve this objective, the company implemented various share-
holder friendly governance-related practices in the last several years. Sony’s substantially
better performance since 1997 seems to suggest the effectiveness of such practices. It
would appear that Sony under the stockholder-centered corporate governance system and
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Mitsubishi Electric under the stakeholder-centered system pursued different performance
objectives and thus adopted different corporate governance policies.
b. Honda and Nissan. Soichiro Honda founded Honda Motor in 1947 to produce motors
for bicycles. In the years that followed, the company grew rapidly as a motorcycle manu-
facturer, successfully penetrating the U.S. market and eventually entering the automobile
manufacturing industry in 1963. As a latecomer to the Japanese automobile industry, which
was dominated by Toyota and Nissan at that time, Honda Motor was forced to grow its
business outside of Japan (Sato, 1995). It thus adopted an international expansion strategy
in the U.S. auto market at the start of its inception to the automobile industry. In order to
succeed in this market, the company decided that it had to rapidly localize its operations,
which included input sourcing, local production, and product design (Sato, 1995). In an
early move to localize its financing needs, Honda Motor issued ADRs in the U.S. in 1962,
following the example set by Sony just a year earlier. The localization of Honda continued
with a program to list its stock on the New York Stock Exchange in 1977. This helped
the company surmount protectionism sentiments during a time of rising trade deficits the
U.S. had with Japan in the late 70s and early 80s (Sato, 1995). Due to its early exposure
to the U.S. investment environment, Honda learned the skills of good investor relations
and rapidly obtained the early support of the American financial community (IR-COM,
1995). As a result of this competency, the Securities Analysts Association of Japan ranked
Honda as the best company on disclosure in the automobile sector in 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 1998.
Honda reports the highest percentage of foreign ownership in its shares than any other
Japanese automobile manufacturer. In 1998, foreign ownership reported by Honda Motor
was 17.8 percent, while that of Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi Motors were 8.1 percent,
10.6 percent, and 7.3 percent, respectively. Honda also reports lower stable ownership shares
than any other major Japanese automobile manufacturer. In 1998, the stable shareholding
content of Honda Motor was 74.3 percent of total equity, while that of Toyota, Nissan, and
Mitsubishi Motors were 85.4 percent, 79.4 percent, and 80.0 percent respectively (Table 5).
Compared to its industry peers, arms length market investors have larger ownership positions
in Honda Motor, implying that Honda Motor is under a greater pressure to respond to the
needs of foreign and domestic market investors for disclosure and transparency.
Table 5. Foreign ownership, stable shareholding positions and corporate group affiliationsa of the major Japanese
automobile manufacturing firms (1998).
Company Foreign ownership (%) Stable shareholding positions (%) Corporate group affiliation
Honda motor 17.8 74.3 Independent
Toyota motor 8.1 85.4 Mitsuib
Nissan motor 10.6 79.4 Fuyo
Mitsubishi motors 7.3 84.0 Mitsubishi
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 1999.
aMitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, DKB.
bToyota Motor has observer status in the Mitsui group.
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Nissan Motor was established in 1933 as part of the Nissan zaibatsu group and thus
boasts a longer history than Honda Motor. The Nissan zaibatsu was dissolved after World
War II and Nissan Motor became part of the Fuyo corporate group in the 1950s, which put
it on its current trajectory of growth. Nissan Motor and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ)
are also closely tied, partly as a result of IBJ being designated the fund provider to Nissan
for its military industrial operations during wartime Japan (Cusumano, 1985).
Due to the company’s close relationships with financial institutions of the Fuyo group
such as Fuji Bank and Yasuda Trust and with the IBJ, Nissan Motor has traditionally had easy
access to bank loan capital for expansion (Nikkei Business, 2000). Where there is equity
ownership, these are mostly cross-held by the Fuyo group of firms and the Nissan Motor’s
own keiretsu member firms. In 1998, foreign ownership in Nissan Motor was 10.6 per-
cent while stable ownership comprised almost 80 percent of total shares. This compares
to Honda Motor’s 17.8 percent and 74.3 percent, respectively. Nissan’s shares are listed
only in Japan and Frankfurt, where disclosure requirements are less stringent than those of
the U.S. Thus, the company is less exposed to the pressures for transparency and corpo-
rate accountability than Honda, and consequently has not felt the need to actively engage
in investor relations activities. This is demonstrated in a recent report by the Security
Analysts Association of Japan, which ranked Nissan seventh among the ten major Japanese
automobile manufacturers in disclosure quality and corporate transparency.
As Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate, Honda and Nissan’s economic performance, together
with those of its peer companies in the automobile industry, are markedly different. Here,
we note that Honda has consistently reported higher profitability in terms of ROS and ROE
than its competitors except in 1996 when Toyota’s ROS was higher. Table 7 shows the
percentage changes in the stock prices of Honda and Nissan. In terms of stock performance,
the pattern is very similar to the Sony-Mitsubishi Electric comparison. Honda substantially
beats Nissan in stock price performance during the 1993–2000 period. It would appear
that greater exposure to foreign capital markets motivated the company to maintain higher
Table 6. Return on sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE) of Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi motors, and Toyota
(March 1996–March 2000).
Honda Nissan Mitsubishi Toyota
1996 ROS 1.7 −1.5 0.4 2.4
ROE 6.5 −6.3 2.6 5.0
1997 ROS 4.2 1.2 0.3 3.2
ROE 17.5 5.7 2.4 7.0
1998 ROS 4.3 −0.2 −2.7 3.9
ROE 17.4 −1.1 −24.4 7.8
1999 ROS 4.9 −0.4 0.2 3.6
ROE 18.1 −2.2 1.6 5.8
2000 ROS 4.3 −11.4 −0.7 3.2
ROE 14.2 −62.7 −6.7 6.3
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 2000.
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Table 7. Percentage changes (%) in stock price of Honda and Nissan.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 93–99
Honda +15 +15 +19 +45 +43 −23 +5 +188
Nissan +35 +10 −4 −17 −21 −36 +15 −39
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 2000.
profits than its peers. These figures suggest that Nissan’s performance objectives are not
focused exclusively on profitability or shareholder value whereas Honda seems to put more
emphasis on those areas, in part, we argue from the differences in its ownership structure.
Differences in two types of corporate governance system
The comparative case analyses, admittedly cursory, seem to suggest that companies in the
same industry can differ in the ways they are strategically focused because of differences
in ownership patterns and network affiliations. The attitudes toward investor relations also
differ with ownership pattern, driving some firms to become more stockholder-centered
and others to be more stakeholder-centered in their approaches to corporate governance.
Those firms with greater exposures to the external capital market, particularly those that
are foreign, tend to put more emphasis on investor relations, information disclosure and
transparency. Those firms that are protected by easy access to internal sources of financing
and credit behave accordingly to maintain the stability of their network relationships. We
have also tried to illustrate how economic performance differs between stockholder centered
and stakeholder-centered firms. Driven by who controls the boardroom agenda, firms that are
more stockholder-centered in their corporate governance seem to emphasize asset efficiency
and stock performance, whereas those that are more stakeholder-centered tend to emphasize
stability. In short, while we have no way of knowing from the data whether Japanese
companies in either type of governance forms differed in terms of operational efficiency,
we do know that they markedly differed in how they used cash flows; whether the cash was
redistributed back to investors or to other stakeholders. From these observations, we draw
the following propositions for future research:
Proposition 1. Japanese companies that belong to corporate groups or keiretsu use a
stakeholder-centered corporate governance system whereas those that do not belong to any
groupings (i.e., are independent) use a stockholder-centered corporate governance system.
Proposition 2. The objective of managerial monitoring in the stakeholder-centered cor-
porate governance system is relationship stability whereas that of the stockholder-centered
corporate governance system is asset efficiency.
Propositions 1 and 2 refer to a static situation. However, we know that corporate gov-
ernance in Japan is far from static. In fact, in response to changes in ownership structure
and institutional environment, many companies are already changing the way they are gov-
erned. In the next section, we develop further propositions that incorporate the changing
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ownership structure and institutional expectations. These propositions aim to examine the
future direction of Japanese corporate governance under a dynamic environment.
5. Ownership and institutional changes and corporate governance in Japan
There is anecdotal evidence that an increasing number of firms within the corporate groups
under the stakeholder-centered governance system are slowly adopting one or more elements
of the stockholder-centered governance system (see Table 8). One of the key factors that
drive these firms to contemplate more shareholder friendly practices appears to be a shift
in ownership structure. Since the mid-1990s, the foreign ownership of Japanese firms has
been rising, reaching over 14% of all listed Japanese shares in 1999.8 At the same time,
cross-shareholdings among affiliated firms have steadily declined. This is largely attributed
to the upcoming accounting change that forces Japanese firms to use market value rather
than book value when disclosing the extent of their stockholdings (Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
September 22, 2000). In order to mitigate the impact of stock price movement on their
profits, many Japanese firms and banks have started to reduce their stockholdings in other
firms. It is reported that cross-shareholdings among large listed Japanese firms declined
2.7% in 1999 from 10.5% in 1998, which in turn was a large drop from about 18% in
1987 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 22, 2000). Although this figure does not include
holdings by life insurance companies and by other unilateral stable shareholders, it does
suggest that the practice of cross-shareholding among Japanese firms is declining.
The importance of the pattern in the rise of foreign ownership and the decline in cross-
shareholdings is that it is not evenly distributed. The impact of the change in ownership
pattern is greater in some firms than in others. In part, this has been due to the rise
in acquisition activity by the foreign competitors of Japanese firms. For example, after
Renault, a French automobile manufacturer, acquired a large portion of Nissan’s
shares in 1999, Nissan’s ownership structure changed dramatically. In March 2000, foreign
Table 8. Recent moves to improve corporate governance by Japanese firms affiliated with corporate groups.
Company (affiliation) Recent moves Foreign ownership (1995–2000)
Orix (Sanwa) Board restructuring (21 to 18) 27.9 → 36.7
Stock option plans
NYSE listing
Toshiba (Mitsui) Board restructuring (33 to 12) 11.5 → 26.6
Nissan Diesel (Nissan) Board restructuring (21 to 10) 2.8 → 24.1
Fujitsu (DKB) Stock option plans 13.4 → 27.6
Greater information disclosure
NEC (Sumitomo) Board restructuring (37 to 17) 16.5 → 29.8
Greater information disclosure
Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui) Stock option plans 11.8 → 19.0
Mitsubishi motors (Mitsubishi) Greater information disclosure 9.6 → 17.4
Source: Nikkei Business, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Kaisha Joho, various issues.
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ownership, including the 36.8% by Renault, reached 53.3%.9 As a result, well over 60%
of Nissan’s shares are now in the hands of foreign and market investors. Together with this
change in ownership, Nissan is attempting to reduce its cross-shareholdings. After Carlos
Ghosn, who is President of Nissan, was sent from Renault as Chief Operating Officer, he
immediately announced a plan to sell most of Nissan’s stockholdings in its keiretsu firms
(Nikkei Business, 2000).
These ownership changes have led Nissan to reform its corporate governance practices,
including the board structure and its relationships with its major financial institutions. The
number of board members was reduced from 42 to 13, of which three represent its major
shareholder, Renault. Nissan redefined its dealings with its financial institutions purely on
the basis of prices and economic benefits, implying that its banking relationships are now
based on arms-length transactions rather than relationship (Nikkei Business, 2000). The
net result is that Nissan can longer expect its financial backers to rescue it and therefore
has to rely on the external market for funds, increasing its exposure to capital market
discipline.
While Nissan represents an extreme case of ownership change, many Japanese firms are
experiencing the rising pressure of non-keiretsu, especially foreign, shareholders to reform
their corporate governance structures and practices. This trend appears to be accelerating,
suggesting that it is not a temporary phenomenon. In a less dramatic example, NEC, a
Sumitomo group firm, experienced a rise in foreign ownership from 16.5% in 1995 to
29.8% in 2000.10 In response to this change and to improve its performance, the company
decided to separate the roles of executive officers and directors in April 2000. The roles
of executive officers and directors are often kept ambiguous in Japanese firms because top
management usually appoints the directors (Abbeglen and Stalk, 1985). NEC’s decision to
define the roles and to separate them makes the directors accountable for their monitoring
role. In addition, NEC reduced the number of the board of directors from 37 to 17 to make
decision-making in the boardroom more effective and efficient. When faced with a change in
ownership structures even keiretsu firms will implement stockholder friendly governance
practices.
Proposition 3. The increase in non-keiretsu and foreign share ownership in Japanese cor-
porate group and keiretsu firms will result in the adoption of stockholder-centered corporate
governance practices by such firms.
The institutional pressures on corporations to reform their corporate governance are
also increasing. Domestic sentiment toward corporate governance is changing in Japan
because of poor corporate and stock performances during the 1990s (Kikuchi, 1999;
Watanabe, 1994). Japanese firms are under increasing public pressure to disclose more
corporate information and to improve the accountability of the board and top executives.
The Corporate Governance Forum of Japan in 1998 released a report calling for Japanese
firms to adopt more stockholder-oriented practices. Business journals have also started to
pay greater attention to this issue often highlighting firms that have implemented corporate
governance reform plans, in part because of the relative novelty. There is even an increas-
ingly popular view that the current problems faced by many Japanese firms stem from the
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lack of effective corporate governance; a radical idea given the traditionally closed nature
of the Japanese boardroom (Wakasugi and Yanai, 2000).
While this institutional pressure is a plausible explanation for a general shift from the
stakeholder-centered to stockholder-centered corporate governance system, it does not fully
explain why some corporate group firms are implementing the new practices but others are
not. An institutional theory perspective may shed some light on this. Accordingly, keiretsu
firms that implement shareholder friendly practices are probably doing so to regain social
legitimacy. Based on Oliver’s (1991) theoretical reasoning, such firms are making a rational
choice to conform to the emerging institutional norms of stockholder–centered corporate
governance because doing so could help them regain social legitimacy, not because they
believe that such practices necessarily improve asset efficiency or can even deliver better
shareholder value.
A number of things may cause firms to lose legitimacy. Prolonged poor corporate perfor-
mance, drastic declines in profits, and ethics scandals have been commonplace in Japanese
corporate life, particularly during the Asian crisis period of 1997–1999. Firms that have ex-
perienced such events would feel a greater pressure to follow publicly endorsed governance
reform plans, such as the reduction of the board members, separation of the role of executive
officers and directors, and better information disclosure practices, regardless of the effects
of such practices on corporate performance. Thus, keiretsu firms may be able to resist the
Figure 1. The Transition from Stakeholder-Centered to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance System in
Japanese Firms.
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institutional pressures for reform if they can achieve superior economic performance or if
they continue to enjoy good social reputations.
Proposition 4. Japanese corporate group and keiretsu firms that have experienced a loss
of social legitimacy are more likely to adopt stockholder-oriented corporate governance
practices.
Taken together, the 4 propositions suggest a future research model shown in figure 1. Here,
the model suggests the effects of institutional and capital market pressures on the adoption
of stockholder-centered corporate governance practices. Such a model easily lends itself to
further empirical testing, which we will discuss in the next section.
6. Conclusions and future research
Prior research on the corporate governance of Japanese firms has largely focused on the
monitoring role of main banks and affiliated companies in keiretsu (Sheard, 1989; Aoki,
1990). An important assumption in such studies has been that while monitoring mechanisms
common to U.S. firms do not exist in the Japanese context, other mechanisms are in place to
mitigate the agency problem. The main bank and keiretsu relationships, cemented through
cross-shareholdings, were seen as the basis of such mechanisms. We take a different tack in
this paper because it is now clear that monitoring by the main banks and keiretsu firms did not
always result in enhanced profitability or good corporate performance (Natakatani, 1984;
Kang and Shvdasani, 1999). In fact, because they were more sensitive to the needs of other
stakeholders, monitoring by these institutions often resulted in lower asset efficiencies, but
higher security for stakeholders. Using their access to management through the boardroom,
the main banks and keiretsu firms attempted to secure their interests by emphasizing a
strategy focused on stable earnings and revenue rather than higher profitability and asset
performance (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Nakatani, 1984). Thus, the agency problem for
the controlling shareholder was attenuated in post-war industrial Japan by expropriating the
claims of minority shareholders. However, because of extremely rapid economic growth
and a lack of boardroom transparency, it was not apparent to outsiders that anything was
amiss in corporate Japan. Shareholders gained only to the extent that the industry in which
the firm competed continued to grow, so that their stock holdings appreciated with the rate of
industry growth. Corporate and institutional shareholders did not care since they had other
objectives for ownership, and retail investors were largely unsophisticated, made ignorant
by a lack of transparency. This situation changed rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s.
The lack of focus on asset efficiency and shareholder value took its toll as a globalized
capital market and product market competition led to the changes in ownership structure
and institutional expectations. The weaknesses of the stakeholder-centered, network-based
corporate governance system were quickly exposed, as this form of governance was not
designed to enhance corporate profitability and shareholder value.
In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate two corporate governance systems in Japan,
the stakeholder-centered system for firms belonging to the corporate groups or keiretsu
and the stockholder-centered one for independent firms. These two corporate governance
systems were able to co-exist because prevailing institutional and financial environments
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allowed it. During a period of economic growth the stakeholder-centered corporate gover-
nance system, which aims to secure business ties rather than shareholder value, worked
adequately because the existence of slack attenuated the need for more market-driven
mechanisms.
We believe our paper has important implications for future corporate governance re-
search. Namely, that in spite of institutional constraints such as traditional business prac-
tices and legal regimes, intensifying global competition and the resulting lower price/cost
margins will force firms to focus on maximizing asset efficiency and shareholder value
if they want to access funds to fuel growth opportunities. The loss of national competi-
tiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change a society’s institutional
norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than operational stability and
business ties. The relationship between the change in ownership structure and the change
in corporate governance practices suggests a dynamic selection mechanism that ensures
the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate the agency
problem.
The case examples we presented in this paper reveal large performance differences be-
tween independent firms and keiretsu-affiliated firms. Does this mean that corporate gover-
nance can make a difference to firm performance? While the anecdotal evidence suggests
the possibility, we think it is premature to make a conclusive statement. This is an area
that needs to be further explored. Theoretically, if a firm changes its corporate governance
practices to better align the interests of management and shareholders, we would expect
such reform to lead to better firm performance. However, if a firm is simply conforming
to institutional norms, no such performance improvements are expected. This is really an
empirical question and therefore best answered with large-scale empirical data in a future
research program.
It would also be instructive to explore other firm-specific factors that can trigger a shift
toward the stockholder-centered corporate governance system. We have suggested owner-
ship structure and the loss of legitimacy. Further study could be directed at the role of top
management in Japanese corporate governance. Specific research on the different responses
by corporate group firms to the current institutional and economic environment may provide
insights on the nature of the inter-organizational cohesiveness of the industrial groups. Why,
for example, do firms in some corporate groups implement stockholder-centered practices
more readily than firms in other groups? We suspect that the receptiveness of individual top
managers may have something to do with this. The results of such a study will shed light on
the organizational antecedents of the effectiveness of various discipline mechanisms in the
stakeholder-centered network-based corporate governance system. Finally, the perspective
developed in this paper can be used as a template to examine similar phenomenon in other
nations in Asia and Europe that have traditionally relied on a stakeholder model of corporate
governance such as Germany, France, and other South East Asian nations.
Notes
1. Calculated as follows: total shares—(foreign ownership + investment trust holdings + floating shares).
2. Many scholars are of the opinion that large boards are often created by CEOs because it disperses power
in the boardroom and reduces the potential for coordinated action by directors, leaving the CEO with de
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facto control. Reducing board size, thus enhancing member participation, is seen as positively associated with
increased CEO monitoring (Hackman, 1990; Jensen, 1993; Leighton and Thain, 1997).
3. This accounts for its large size, and the ambiguity of directors’ roles.
4. Kigyo keiretsu Soran, Toyo Keizai, 1998.
5. Yuka Shoken Hokokusho, 1998.
6. Security Analysts Association of Japan, 1999.
7. For example, at the annual conference of the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan in 1999, Sony’s senior
manager stated that enhancement of shareholder value is critical not only from the perspective of shareholders’
interests but also in terms of the protection from hostile takeovers.
8. Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa, 2000.
9. Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 2000.
10. Nikkei Kaisha Joho, 1997, 2000.
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